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Since the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, corporate terrorism insurance is sold as a 
separate policy from commercial property coverage. In this paper, we determine whether companies 
differ in their demand for property and terrorism insurance. Using a unique dataset of insurance policies 
purchased by large U.S. firms, combined with financial information of the corporate clients and of the 
insurance provider, we apply a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to obtain consistent estimates of 
premium elasticity of corporate demand for property and terrorism coverage. Our findings suggest that 
both are rather price inelastic and that corporate demand for terrorism insurance is significantly more 
price inelastic than demand for property insurance. We further find a negative relation between the 
solvency ratios of both property and terrorism risk coverage, with a stronger effect on the latter, indicating 
that companies use their ability to self-insure as a substitute for market insurance. Our results are robust to 
the application of alternative estimators as well as changes in the econometric specifications.  
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1. Introduction 
In the past 30 years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the economic costs of natural and man-
made disasters around the world, from $528 billion (1981-1990) to more than $1.2 trillion over the period 
2001-2010. The years 2011 and 2012 triggered another $580 billion in losses (Munich Re, 2013). In the 
United States recent catastrophes have included terrorism (e.g., the 1993 WTC bombing; the September 
11, 2001 attacks), wildfires, hurricanes, flooding (e.g., Hurricane Katrina in 2005; Ike in 2008; Irene in 
2011, Sandy in 2012) and technological accidents (e.g., the 2003 blackout; the 2010 BP oil spill). 
Individuals typically transfer the financial risks associated with such hazards either to primary insurers by 
purchasing coverage prior to a disaster and/or de facto to taxpayers if they receive post disaster 
government relief as many have in recent years. Firms have a variety of financial risk-transfer tools 
available to protect themselves against the economic consequences of negative outcomes (i.e., left-tail 
exposure).  
Doherty (2000) and Hau (2004) posit that firms’ principal risk associated with property damage is a lack 
of liquidity, which forces them to sell their most liquid assets at a lower than desired price. Catastrophes 
can also trigger significant business interruptions and prevent firms from fulfilling their contractual 
commitments. If the firm is unable to raise enough short-term capital to repair the damage, it faces the 
risk of bankruptcy.2 
There are a number of potential sources of short-term capital that firms can access to replace damaged 
property and cover business interruptions. They can use cash reserves or increase debt by borrowing 
money at the market rate (self-insurance). Alternatively, they can obtain property insurance ex ante that 
covers potential damages (market insurance). 
Corporate risk management aims at reducing the probability of such untoward events (Stulz 1996) and 
cash-flow variability when they occur (Froot, Scharfstein & Stein 1993). The literature has typically 
focused on the use of corporate derivatives as a hedge against negative outcomes. Leland (1998) has 
shown theoretically that the use of derivatives could have a direct effect on cash-flow and an indirect 
effect on negative (left-tail) outcomes. Smith & Stulz (1985) discuss the firm’s use of a hedging strategy 
with off-balance-sheet instruments such as options and futures. Empirical work (e.g., Nance, Smith & 
Smithson 1993, Colquitt & Hoyt 1997, Gezcy, Minton & Schrand 1997, Graham & Rogers 2002) further 
suggests that derivatives are widely used by firms. 
The problem with the application of derivative use to study corporate risk management, though, is that it 
is not clear a priori whether a firm hedges (left-tail outcomes) or speculates (right-tail outcomes) (e.g., 
Colquitt & Hoyt 19973, Hentschel & Kothari 2001, Allayannis & Ofek 2001). By focusing on insurance 
purchase instead, it is possible to quantify both the left-tail exposure (risks to which the firm is exposed) 
                                                            
2 This is part of a larger discussion in recent years about the value of good corporate risk management and enterprise-wide risk 
management. For instance, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) found a positive relation between firm value (measured by its Tobin’s Q) 
and the adoption of enterprise risk management (with a 20% premium).  
3 For instance, Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) provides an important empirical analysis of the degree to which 571 life insurers use 
futures and options for the purpose of hedging economic risk. In their study they are able to differentiate between hedgers and 
non-hedgers, based on the self-reported declaration of these insurers in their annual NAIC reporting. They show that the size of 
the insurer, its leverage and the degree of asset and liability duration mismatch all are positively related to the likelihood of the 
insurer of hedging its risks with futures and options. 
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and the hedging strategy a corporation adopts (insurance it buys to protect against those risks). Moreover, 
corporate insurance use for gains would require that the firm engage in fraudulent activities (we thus 
disregard the possibility that firms use insurance for speculating). 
Since the 1980s there has been a growing literature analyzing why and when firms purchase insurance. 
One explanation is that corporations are required by law to buy some insurance (e.g. workers’ 
compensation insurance is required in all states of the Union, except Texas). There might be also 
contractual obligations from a bank or bond covenant (Garven & MacMinn 1993). Aside from these 
requirements, a number of scholars have tried to develop a positive theory of corporate insurance demand. 
There might be some tax incentives since the tax code allows firms to deduct insurance premiums as 
business expenses (Main 1983; Chen & PonArul, 1989; Hoyt & Khang, 2000). Mayers & Smith (1982) 
and MacMinn (1987) argue that insurance is just another form of financing by firms and that it helps 
avoid the transaction costs of bankruptcy. Indeed the probability of incurring these costs is lowered by 
shifting the firm’s exposure risk to the insurance company. Greenwald & Stiglitz (1990) and Greenwald 
& Stiglitz (1993) provide seminal theories that show how the risk of bankruptcy and the existence of 
incentive systems within the firm could lead managers to act in a risk-averse manner on behalf of the 
company, and thus purchase insurance coverage when a risk-neutral firm would not do so. This is also 
consistent with work in behavioral economics that postulates that managers in the risk management 
department of a firm might somewhat over-insure the firm as the precaution against being held 
responsible for large losses that might occur if the firm is underinsured (Borkan & Kunreuther 1979). 
Firms might also tend to focus on the consequences of an outcome (in particular, the risk of financial 
ruin) rather than the probability of occurrence of the catastrophic event. This can be particularly relevant 
in the case of terrorism we study here, since it is almost impossible to correctly assess probabilities of 
attacks (Kunreuther, Pauly & McMorrow, 2013).  
Surprisingly, however, empirical evidence for these theories has been lacking for the past 20 years. Most 
likely, this is due to the difficulty for the research community to access detailed commercial insurance 
data for a large enough sample of firms. Firms are indeed often reluctant to share such data because of 
proprietary issues, regulatory requirements and anti-trust law. This certainly explains why only a handful 
of studies have been published on corporate demand for insurance in the finance literature to date (e.g., 
Core 1997, Yamori 1999, Hoyt & Khang 2000, Aunon-Nerin & Ehling 20084).  
Studying corporate demand for terrorism insurance is interesting for several reasons. First, terrorism 
presents a set of fairly peculiar characteristics for firms: the risk is difficult to quantify and is dynamic in 
nature since it depends on what action the terrorists may take in response to those undertaken by firms at 
risk. It is also not clear what physical mitigation measures firms should invest in that will really be 
effective at deterring terrorist attacks. For instance, a firm operating in the World Trade Center towers 
could not have done much to protect itself from commercial aircraft being crashed into the building on 
September 11, 2011 (9/11). Insurance against all potential types of attacks might therefore be a desirable 
risk management strategy. Many managers also consider terrorism risk as the ultimate low-probability 
high-consequence event over which they have almost no control: there have been three successful terrorist 
attacks on U.S. soil that led to large-scale devastating losses. In February 1993, Al Qaeda detonated a 
large truck bomb in the garage of the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. This event 
                                                            
4 Mayers and Smith (1990) focus specifically on reinsurance purchases by U.S. property and liability insurers. 
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shut Tower 1 down for six weeks and Tower 2 for four weeks. While it did the entire building did not 
collapse (as the terrorists had planned), it killed six people and caused over $750 million in insured losses 
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan 2004).5 In April 1995, the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in downtown 
Oklahoma City was bombed by Timothy McVeigh. 168 people were killed and another 700 injured. The 
blast damaged 324 buildings within a sixteen-block radius.  This attack caused about $650 million worth 
of damage. The federal government, who owned the building was self-insured against potential losses. 
This event demonstrated that the threat of terrorism could be domestic and that it did not take much 
sophistication to inflict massive losses.  The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on 9/11 resulted in over 3,000 
deaths and a historic record high insured losses of $45 billion (2013 price)6—it was then the most costly 
event in the history of insurance, now second only to hurricane Katrina in 2005 in the U.S.  
Before 9/11 commercial insurance contracts typically included terrorism as an unnamed peril and insurers 
did not charge for it. Following 9/11 and the passage of the 2002 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) 
firms have the option to purchase terrorism insurance coverage as a separate policy that can be added on 
to their property insurance. Insurers have to offer the same limits on a terrorism risk insurance policy as 
they do for property coverage but the client can decide to purchase a different limit.7 One can thus 
measure corporate demand for terrorism insurance specifically and compare it with the demand for 
property coverage.8   If the risk of bankruptcy and managers’ self-interest is what partly triggers corporate 
interest in purchasing insurance to hedge left-tail outcomes, then corporate demand for terrorism 
insurance should be more price inelastic than for property coverage.9 Past terrorist attacks have all been 
very costly and highly mediatized events. Risk-averse managers should thus see a large-scale terrorist 
attack against the firm as potentially more harmful to the company and to their reputation than other 
losses covered by property insurance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also increased the liability of 
corporate directors, who in turn may be more willing to demand the purchase of terrorism insurance.  
This paper benefits from a unique firm-level dataset we were able to access as part of a research 
partnership with Marsh & McLennan, a large insurance broker. We obtained data on complete insurance 
purchases by 1,808 large U.S. corporations headquartered across the country. The insurance purchased is 
for their U.S. operations only. These data contain information about the quantity of insurance purchased 
and the premiums paid by these firms for two lines of risk -- property and terrorism (demand side). We 
                                                            
5 The Bishopsgate bombing of 24 April 1993 in the financial district of London, UK, cost over 1 billion British pounds worth of 
damage (OECD, 2005).  
6 All firms operating in the WTC were insured. 
7 Terrorism insurance under TRIA covers terrorist attacks perpetrated by U.S. citizens and foreigners alike. Policies typically 
exclude attacks using weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear), considered uninsurable by the 
market. A more detailed description of the U.S. terrorism insurance market can be found in Brown, Cummins, Lewis & Wei 
(2004) and Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan (2004). 
8 Note that typical property insurance includes some coverage for hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. But because the coverage is 
bonded with many other types of risk the policy covers, one cannot specifically measure the demand for hurricane risk insurance 
alone, for instance. For residential insurance this can be done because flood and earthquake insurance is sold as separate policy. 
(See Browne and Hoyt 2000 on the demand for residential flood insurance, for instance.)  
9 More recent literature supports this view, suggesting that some of the variance in corporate performance can be attributed to 
discretionary behavior of individual managers (e.g., Adams, Almeida & Ferreira 2005, Bloom & Van Reenen 2010). Bertrand & 
Schoar (2003) provide compelling evidence that investment and financial decisions of firms depend on executives’ fixed effects 
which affect risk-taking behavior, and that the extent of this influence is economically large. 
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also accessed a set of financial data from the ORBIS database, to control for the effects of companies’ 
ability to self-insure. 
A further strength of our analysis is that we also access insurance company-level data for insurers that 
covered these firms (supply side). Therefore, we know not only the quantity of insurance a given firm has 
purchased, at what cost, but also who provided that coverage. This is important methodologically because 
the econometric analysis of the corporate demand for insurance can be complicated by the inherent 
endogeneity problem associated with the relationship between premium and the degree of coverage. 
Indeed, corporate clients make a simultaneous decision on the premium and the degree of coverage. This 
can potentially create a problem of reversed causality and thus lead to erroneous analysis if one uses 
traditional econometrics.  In this paper, we overcome this endogeneity problem by using insurer-specific 
variables as instrumental variables for insurance premium to identify the causal relationship between 
premium and insurance quantity. 
Combining demand and supply data we can then empirically examine corporate demand for insurance. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows: (1) We find that a majority of firms in our sample (59%) do 
purchase terrorism insurance, demonstrating that this has become sizeable market. (2) Corporate demand 
for terrorism insurance and property insurance are found to be rather inelastic. For those firms that 
purchase terrorism insurance, the demand for that coverage is found to be more price inelastic than their 
demand for property coverage, as we hypothesized. Depending on the applied estimation technique used 
for the analysis, the price elasticity for property coverage ranges from -0.19 to -0.36, while the price 
elasticity of corporate demand for terrorism coverage ranges from -0.11 to -0.25. (3) There exists a 
substitutional relationship between a client’s ability to self-insure (measured by the current and solvency 
ratios) and insurance use, but it is statistically significant only for solvency ratio and terrorism insurance 
coverage. In other words, a firm is more likely to purchase terrorism insurance when in greater danger of 
bankruptcy as measured by the solvency ratio. (4) Our findings confirm the proposition by Doherty 
(2000) that larger firms are more diversified and have developed internal risk management capacity, 
which results in their purchasing proportionally less coverage than smaller firms. Interestingly, the size of 
the estimated effect does not differ much between terrorism and property coverage suggesting that they 
make insurance-related decisions independent of coverage type.   Our results are robust if we account for 
endogenous deductible choices in a 3SLS framework and account for distributional features of the 
dependent variable using Tobit or QMLE estimators. Further, they are not sensitive to changes in the 
choice of measures of company size and of financial strength. One possible interpretation of our results is 
that risk-averse managers are a driver for corporate demand for property insurance (e.g. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz 1990; 1993, and Mayers & Smith 1982; Kunreuther, Pauly & McMorrow, 2013). However, due to 
a lack of appropriate direct measures (e.g. percentage of shares held by managers) we are not able to test 
this hypothesis directly.  
The paper is also timely since TRIA was renewed several times since 2002, most recently for seven years 
in 2007. Set to expire at the end of December 2014 unless renewed by Congress and the President, the 
paper proposes new knowledge on a market for which empirical analysis is lacking. The analysis should 
thus be of interest to policymakers and the corporate world alike.    
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The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In Section 2, we present our data. Section 3 
discusses our empirical strategy. The results of our analysis are discussed In Section 4 we discuss the 
results of our analysis and undertake a series of robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Data 
 
The data used in this study are collected from three different sources:  Marsh, ORBIS and A.M. Best.  
Data on property and terrorism insurance contracts was obtained from Marsh, which provided us with 
company-level insurance contract data on their clients headquartered in the United States in 2007. 
Contract details were reported through an intranet form completed by brokers from Marsh’s offices 
in the United States. Company identities were kept anonymous through the use of random ID 
numbers designed specifically for this study. We assume that idiosyncrasies among brokers or 
offices were randomly distributed across the dataset. The original dataset included 1,884 companies.  
We have removed companies with total insured value lower than $1 million, which left us with 1,808 
firms.  
Assets for both lines of insurance coverage are exclusively located in the United States. And while the 
data does not include the exact locations of all of the companies’ assets, we used the location of the 
Marsh office which brokered the policy (typically in the same location as the headquarters of the 
company) as the proxy for location when we undertake regional analyses. Given that each individual 
contract covered multiple locations for a single company, we assume that the number of locations per 
company is randomly distributed across our dataset. (Marsh divides their offices into nine major 
regions, each combining a number of states
10
). Firms in the dataset were divided into 20 industry 
sectors.  Table 1 shows the distribution of companies within the full sample across these different 
industry sectors.  Of the 1,808 companies, 1,064 had purchased terrorism insurance in conjunction 
with their normal property insurance. This implies a market penetration of 59% (Table 1).11  The 
terrorism insurance take-up rate varies across industry sectors, ranging from a low 16.7% in mining to a 
high 78.2% in real estate. Of these 1,064 companies we have comple te  observations with information 
about the degree of coverage and the premium paid for both property and terrorism insurance for 
628 of them. 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Central Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Wisconsin; Mid-Atlantic: District of Columbia, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Philadelphia); New York Metro: Connecticut (Norwalk); New Jersey (Morristown), New York (New 
York City); Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New York (Rochester, Syracuse), Rhode Island; South Central: 
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; Southeast: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia; 
Southwest: Arizona, California (Los Angeles, Newport Beach, San Diego); Upper Midwest: Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania (Pittsburgh); West: Alaska, California (San Francisco, San Jose), Colorado, Hawaii, Oregon, Utah, Washington. 
(Note that California, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania include offices that are in multiple regions. The specific 
locations are included in parentheses.) 
11 Market penetration/take-up rate is defined here as the percentage of companies that have a terrorism insurance policy, and not 
the amount of assets insured against terrorism over the total amount of assets. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Companies Across Industries and Terrorism Insurance Take-Up Rate – Full Sample 
Industry Firms Without terror insurance              % 
Agriculture 11 3 27.27% 
Construction & Design 46 23 50.00% 
Distribution 35 19 54.29% 
Education 75 55 73.33% 
Financial Institutions 78 56 71.79% 
Food & Beverages 79 40 50.63% 
Healthcare 156 115 73.72% 
Hospitality & Gaming 84 56 66.67% 
Manufacturing 452 199 44.03% 
Media 46 29 63.04% 
Mining 18 3 16.67% 
Pharmaceutical 36 20 55.56% 
Power & Utilities 105 69 65.71% 
Public Entities 59 35 59.32% 
Real Estate 124 97 78.23% 
Retail & Wholesale 125 70 56.00% 
Services 120 76 63.33% 
Technology 68 41 60.29% 
Telecomm 27 17 62.96% 
Transportation 64 41 64.06% 
Total 1,808 1,064   
 
 
The Marsh dataset contains both publicly traded and private companies.  Standard sources of 
financial data, such as COMPUSTAT, however, contain information only for publicly listed 
companies. We therefore used the ORBIS database distributed by Bureau van Dijk that contains 
balance sheet information, profit and loss statements and a variety of financial ratios for over 19.2 
million companies in the U.S. and Canada.  We matched the ORBIS data with the Marsh dataset in 
those cases where an exact identification was possible and where both insurance and financial data 
were available. For a large number of companies in the Marsh dataset, exact matching with the ORBIS 
data was not possible. This reduced our final dataset to 193 companies for which we are able to estimate 
both the premium elasticity for both types of coverage and the effect of self-insurance. However, we are 
able to estimate premium elasticity and analyze the effect of size, industry and headquarter location on a 
sample of 628 firms, which we will use to supplement our findings on the 193 firms.  The final sample in 
our study is similar in size to the studies by Hoyt & Khang (2000) (N=187) and by Aunon-Nerin & 
Ehling (2008) (N=183).  
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The average size of the companies in our final sample is measured by assets that are covered under 
property insurance; that is, the total insured value (TIV, hereafter).12  This measurement contains 
tangible assets only, and no values associated with business interruptions or workers’ compensation.  
The mean for the TIV variable in our final sample is $3.16 billion (median of $2.95 billion).  Our 
dependent variable is the degree of coverage, CoverTerror, defined as the ratio of the quantity of 
terrorism insurance the firm purchased (i.e., the maximum terrorism claim payment the firm can receive 
from its insurer, minus the deductible) to TIV. We construct the variable for property insurance, 
CoverProperty, in a similar way. It is defined as the ratio of the quantity of property insurance the firm 
purchased (i.e., the maximum property claim payment the firm can receive from its insurer, minus the 
deductible) to TIV. 
We find that the mean degree of coverage against terrorism, CoverTerror, is 0.350, and the mean degree 
of property coverage, CoverProperty, is 0.441. This indicates that, on average, firms that purchased 
terrorism insurance had a limit on their contract which represents 35% of the total insured value in the 
case of terrorism insurance, and 44% of the total insured value for property. 
The premiums paid by the company for terrorism insurance and for property insurance are labeled 
PremiumTerror and PremiumProperty, respectively. We also calculate the premium paid by these companies 
per $1,000 of coverage and we measured it for both terrorism and property insurance (noted 
PremiumTerror/QuantityTerror and PremiumProperty/QuantityProperty). On average, firms pay eight times more 
for property than they do for terrorism ($4.943 versus $0.628 per $1,000 of quantity of insurance 
purchased; i.e. coverage minus deductible.)13 The correlation between property and terrorism insurance 
premium is 0.34. 
In order to consider possible sample selection biases, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the 
original sample (upper panel), the subsample consisting of firms that have property and terror coverage 
(middle panel, N=628) and the final sample consisting of firms with both types of coverage, information 
about self-insurance capability of the insured and insurer specific information (lower panel, N=193). 
Comparing the descriptive statistics between the full sample and the sample of firms with both types of 
coverage (that is, the upper and middle panels), we do not find noticeable difference in the degree of 
coverage, firm size or premium. This makes us confident that a potential sample selection bias resulting 
from the constraint that the firms purchased both property and terrorism insurance will not be of concern.  
If we compare the differences between the sample in the middle panel and the set of firms for which 
information on all controls are available (lower panel), we find that the degree of coverage for both 
property and terrorism is somewhat smaller in the final sample. Insurance premiums are again very 
similar. The only significant difference appears to be in the size of the firms (TIV). The final sample is 
composed of firms that are on average larger than the firms in the full sample and the subsample with 
both types of coverage. Comparing the maximum values between the three panels also suggests that this 
difference is not driven by an outlier in size (the maximum TIV in the final sample is $54 billion 
compared to $93 billion in the other two samples). The most likely explanation for this difference is that 
                                                            
12 Note that we have information only about the total dollar value of insurance purchased by the firm and not the decomposition 
of assets under coverage (e.g., building, inventory, land, brand). 
13 We find that a firm with a $1.97 billion of insured value (which is the mean for our sample of 628 firms that purchased both 
property and terrorism insurance; Table 2) pays $1.16 million in premium per year for terrorism insurance. 
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on average larger firms are more likely to report (voluntarily) their financial and budget figures to 
ORBIS and therefore our final sample is composed of comparably larger firms. 
As empirical proxies for a company’s capability to borrow money in the short term (self-insurance 
capacity) we use 2005 values of the solvency and current ratios accounting for the company’s ability to 
meet long-term and short-term debt, respectively (noted SolvencyRatio and CurrentRatio).14  
To account for the demand-supply interaction that determines insurance purchase decisions (we discuss 
the rationale for this choice in the next section), we use a third source of data, that is supply-side data on 
the insurance companies providing property and terrorism coverage to all the firms in our sample in 2007 
using annual A.M. Best Insurance Reports-P/C US & Canada (Version 2008.1). To proxy for the 
insurance company’s marginal cost via its risk bearing capacity we use Liquidity and Operating Revenue. 
Liquidity is calculated by A.M. Best and gives the ratio of total admitted assets divided by total liabilities 
less conditional reserves, expressed as a percent. This ratio indicates a company's ability to cover net 
liabilities with total assets. Operating revenue is also a ratio calculated by A.M. Best and measures an 
insurer’s overall operating profitability from underwriting and investment activity. The supply and 
demand datasets were then merged using the unique insurance company identifier.  Based on available 
information for all these variables, it was possible to identify the full information on insurance supplier 
for 141 of the 193 large companies in the subsample. The final sample consists of data from 15 different 
insurance suppliers.  
 
                                                            
14 The solvency ratio is calculated by adding the company's post-tax net profit and depreciation, and dividing the sum by the 
quantity of long-term and short-term liabilities; the resulting amount is expressed as a percentage. A high solvency ratio indicates 
a healthy company, while a low ratio indicates the opposite. A low solvency ratio further indicates likelihood of default. The 
current ratio is defined as current assets over current liabilities (often over the next twelve months). Both are available in the 
ORBIS database.  
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3.  Empirical Approach 
Based on our discussion above, we specify the following empirical demand function for each type of risk 
c (terrorism or property): 
      Coverci  0  1 ln(TIVci ) 2 ln(PremiumciQuantityci ) 3SolvencyRatioi  4CurrentRatioi  Ii  Ri ci
     (1) 
where Coverci denotes, for company i, its degree of coverage for risk type c. TIV is the total insured value 
of company i and Premium/Quantity is the cost of insurance (premium per $1,000 of quantity for the 
respective type of insurance). I and R are industry and region specific dummies; εci is the error term and β 
are coefficients to be estimated. 
Warner (1977) suggests that economies of scale reduce the bankruptcy costs of large firms. Doherty 
(2000) posits that corporate clients receive benefits from market insurance that go beyond the sole 
transfer of financial risk. Insurance companies provide their corporate clients with risk management 
expertise and often help them to develop appropriate risk management strategies. Larger corporate clients 
are more likely to produce some of these risk management services in-house (e.g., they maintain their 
own risk-management department) than smaller corporate clients. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume 
that smaller companies have a higher demand for the real service component that comes with an insurance 
policy. Hence, we expect β1 to depict a negative sign for property coverage.  
Whether this is also the case for terrorism insurance is not clear a priori. Indeed, terrorism has a set of 
characteristics that make it fairly different than risks covered under the property coverage. Terrorism 
threat is difficult to predict, and there is not as much data on claims and frequency as there is for fire or 
even natural hazards. As we discussed in the introduction, only a handful of terrorist attacks occurred on 
U.S. soil and were insured. As such, it is not clear whether insurers have the same level of service value in 
the case of terrorism as they have for property. Furthermore, larger firms might also be more likely to be 
targeted by terrorist organizations if those are perceived as “trophy” targets (Enders and Sandler, 2006); 
as such, larger firms might be more likely to purchase more terrorism coverage, relative to their total 
insurance value than smaller ones, all things being equal. The sign of β1 for terrorism coverage is thus 
ambiguous, and ultimately a matter of empirical analysis.  
The coefficient β2 exhibits the price elasticity of demand. We expect β2 to be negative and significant for 
both property and terrorism. We also expect to find β2 to be higher for property than for terrorism; that is, 
to find the demand for terrorism insurance to be more price inelastic for reasons we explained in the 
introduction that review the literature and our hypotheses.  
The marginal effects of a firm’s access to short-term capital on its insurance demand is represented by 
coefficients β3 (SolvencyRatio) and β4 (CurrentRatio). A negative sign would indicate that self-insurance 
and market insurance are substitutes, while a positive sign indicates a complementary relationship. The 
correlation between Solvency Ratio and Current Ratio in our sample is 0.31. Excluding either one of the 
two ratios from the empirical demand function (1) does not change the results. We also include industry, 
Ii, and regions specific effects, Ri, to account for variations in demand between industries and geographic 
areas. 
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The analysis needs to overcome two econometric issues: The first one is related to the endogenous 
relationship between insurance coverage and premium, while the second one is associated with the 
distribution and bounded nature of the dependent variable. We discuss them in turn now.  
First, there might be an endogenous relationship between the dependent variable Coverci and the main 
explanatory variable, Premium/Quantity. Insurance companies and corporate clients negotiate an 
insurance package that consists of the insurance quantity and the premium. The client makes a 
simultaneous decision on the package (premium and quantity). Therefore, the observed data in our 
insurance dataset is basically a collection of equilibrium points on the supply and demand curve. A 
standard OLS estimator is not able to identify the demand relationship and therefore the price elasticity. 
Insurance premium is likely to be correlated with some other unobserved variable embodied in the error-
term. The OLS estimates of β2 will represent not only the effect of Premiumc/Quantityc on Coverc but also 
the effect of the unobserved variable, possibly yielding biased and inconsistent results.   
One way to address this problem is the application of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach.  In our 
case, this requires instruments that are good predictors with changes in the insurance premium (relevance) 
but are uncorrelated with the error-term in the demand equation (validity). In a demand-supply 
relationship we can use variables that affect the marginal cost of the supply of insurance.  
The choice of instruments in this paper is based on Kleffner & Doherty (1996) who suggest a number of 
factors that determine insurers’ ability to write corporate coverage. It typically depends on financial 
indicators that have an impact on the cost of risk bearing. We use Liquidity and Operating Revenue as 
proxies for the insurer’s financial strength and risk-bearing capacity. The work by Kleffner & Doherty 
(1996) already shows that insurer’s financial strengths are strong determinants of the level of insurance 
premium; therefore we are confident that these variables are relevant instruments in our case. In addition, 
we apply the Kleibergen-Paap test statistics, which provides further support for this claim (Table 3). Our 
identifying assumption is that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term in the second stage. Albeit 
not perfect,15 we can evaluate our instruments’ validity by applying statistical tests for over-identifying 
restrictions. 
Our second strategy to deal with the endogeneity follows the approach of Aunon-Nerin & Ehling (2008) 
who apply a three-stage least-squares (3SLS) model to simultaneously estimate the limit and the 
deductible choice. In cases where the variance-covariance matrix is diagonal and each equation in the 
system is just-identified, 2SLS and 3SLS yield the same results. If we assume that all equations are 
correctly specified, 3SLS is asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS procedure, but 2SLS is more 
robust. Assuming that our instruments are exogenous, the 2SLS estimates can be considered consistent. 
Instead of making assumptions about whether the equations in our system are correctly specified, we just 
present 3SLS estimates and compare them to the 2SLS estimates.  
Applying a 3SLS estimator further allows us to simultaneously model the deductible choice. Second, we 
need to consider the bounded nature of the dependent variable (Coverci) which is always between 0 and 1 
and the fact that our observations are concentrated at the upper boundary.  
                                                            
15 Sargan and Hansen tests should only be interpreted as auxiliary support for theoretical validity. These test statistics for over-
identifying restrictions basically tests for the equality of the instrumental variable (IV) estimates from each instrument. In a case 
where both instruments are correlated, they can be potentially endogenous for the same reasons and therefore IV estimates from 
the individual instruments will be similarly inconsistent. 
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Estimating equation (1) with OLS or an OLS regression with non-linear transformation of the explanatory 
variable does not guarantee that the predicted results lie within the range of the independent variable’s 
interval.  Papke & Wooldridge (1996) present a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE hereafter) 
to obtain unbiased estimates. We adopt the same methodology here.  Still, to check whether our estimates 
are indeed sensitive to the estimator applied, we estimate equation (1) using QMLE and run the analysis 
for, Tobit and IV-Tobit as well. 
 
4. Results 
We commence the presentation of our results with the instrumental variable (IV)-estimates of our baseline 
specifications in Table 3. The lower panel of the table contains coefficient estimates of the first stage 
regression where we use the insurer’s Operating Revenue and Liquidity as exogenous instruments for 
Premium/Quantity.16 Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. A significant p-value 
for the Kleinbergen-Paap test is additional evidence that our instruments are strong and relevant. The 
instruments also pass the Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions. The second stage estimate on 
Premium/Quantity is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.   
The second stage results are presented in the upper panel of Table 3. The coefficient of TIV (total insured 
value) is negative and highly significant for both property and terrorism coverage, indicating again that 
larger companies have, on average, a lower degree of coverage than smaller firms (ratio quantity over 
TIV is lower), confirming the hypothesis discussed earlier. This might be due to higher geographical 
diversification of their assets. It could also be that smaller firms purchase insurance to access risk-
management expertise of the insurers (Doherty 2000). In addition, larger companies also have better 
access to short-term capital and might substitute market insurance with self-insurance (Hau 2004). 
Comparing the coefficients of the TIV shows that this effect of company size (larger companies have a 
lower degree of coverage than smaller firms) is similar between the two types of insurance coverage.  
The price elasticity coefficients are negative and significant at the 1% level. All coefficient values are 
between 0 and -1, indicating that corporate demand for property and terrorism insurance is rather 
inelastic. In particular, a 10% increase in property premium leads to a 2.1% decrease in property 
coverage, while a 10% increase in terrorism premium leads to only a 1.3% decrease in terrorism 
coverage. To test whether the estimated coefficients of price elasticity systematically differ between each 
type of insurance we perform a Chow test. The Chow test is a standard t-test on the equality of 
coefficients for each type of coverage. In our main specification (including all control variables),17 the 
Chow test yields a critical t-value of 22.91 and strongly rejects the null hypothesis of equality of 
coefficients. 
                                                            
16 We regress individual level data (premium of one client) on more aggregate variables (Operating Revenue and Liquidity are on 
insurance company level and one insurance company supplies multiple firms in our sample). Moulton (1990) shows that in such a 
situation the estimated coefficients are consistent but the standard errors are biased downwards. To account for within-group 
correlation we adjust standard errors for within insurance company clustering. The results stay qualitatively the same if we do not 
adjust for within-group clustering.  
17 The results of the Chow-test are very similar for the other specifications. 
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This first set of 2SLS results thereby confirms our hypothesis that the demand for terrorism insurance is 
more price inelastic than the one for property. The coefficient for SolvencyRatio is negative and 
significant for both property and terrorism insurance, indicating some substitution effect between self-
insurance and insurance purchased by these firms. But these coefficients are rather small. A 10% higher 
solvency ratio reduces demand for property coverage by 0.1% (significant at 5%) and for terrorism 
insurance by 0.3% (significant at 1%). Possibly, the variable for company size explains much of the 
variation related to a company’s ability to generate money to cover property damages. Alternatively, 
many firms use bonds, and those contracts often require some insurance, as do some suppliers and 
customers. In addition, some might consider that a firm with a higher current ratio is still vulnerable to 
catastrophe risks (whether they are covered under property or require terrorism insurance) in a sense that 
a sudden and very large loss will make the willingness to purchase debt in the aftermath of a disaster 
difficult and costly; purchasing insurance ex ante would avoid this problem.  
Several industry dummies yield a robust significant negative effect in the case of terrorism insurance; we 
found this effect for media, power and utilities, and services. But there is no significant industry effect for 
property insurance (except for media), which is somewhat surprising given that previous studies show 
that industry sector is an important determinant of corporate demand for property insurance (e.g., Hoyt & 
Khang 2000). It is very likely that the premium already picks up differences in exposure to property risks 
between industry types. 
Regarding regional differences, we find that corporate demand for property insurance is higher in the 
New York Metro area (+9.7%). On average, corporate clients are located in closer proximity to each other 
there. Hazards to property such as a fire or a chemical spill are more likely to affect other companies 
located in the area. The demand for terrorism insurance is even higher in the New York Metro area 
(+20.6%), and remains higher for the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions. Compared to the other region 
dummies, these are very densely populated and urbanized areas. The events of 9/11 also showed that 
terrorist attacks in urban centers often affect multiple companies at once. In the case of New York there 
could be a “trophy target” effect in that terrorist organizations capable of inflicting a large-scale attack 
might be more likely to attack a city that represents so much of an American symbol.  This was precisely 
the logic behind the 1993 and 2001 Al Qaeda’s attacks.  
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Table 3: Demand for Property and Terrorism Insurance - Baseline Results 
Property Terror Property Terror
-0.099*** -0.098*** -0.099*** -0.094***
(0.014) (0.026) (0.014) (0.024)
-0.213*** -0.127*** -0.219*** -0.138***
(0.035) (0.049) (0.034) (0.049)
-0.001** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.005 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Construction 0.008 -0.130 -0.015 -0.166
(0.172) (0.133) (0.181) (0.150)
Distribution 0.021 -0.058 -0.029 -0.143
(0.172) (0.195) (0.159) (0.163)
Education -0.072 -0.079 -0.097 -0.138
(0.096) (0.110) (0.096) (0.110)
Financial Insitutions -0.033 -0.033 -0.089 -0.138
(0.123) (0.108) (0.121) (0.107)
Food & Beverages 0.182 0.091 0.141 0.037
(0.131) (0.159) (0.137) (0.178)
Healthcare -0.044 0.028 -0.091 -0.052
(0.104) (0.142) (0.105) (0.141)
Hospitality 0.032 -0.062 0.006 -0.099
(0.096) (0.079) (0.100) (0.080)
Manufacturing 0.051 -0.103 0.027 -0.148
(0.091) (0.121) (0.091) (0.119)
Media -0.199** -0.109 -0.249*** -0.187***
(0.086) (0.085) (0.089) (0.089)
Pharmaceutical -0.036 -0.016 -0.073 -0.092
(0.101) (0.121) (0.098) (0.098)
Power & Utilities -0.061 -0.108 -0.103 -0.179**
(0.095) (0.089) (0.095) (0.087)
Real Estate -0.014 0.092 -0.069 -0.002
(0.098) (0.123) (0.097) (0.112)
Retail/Wholesale -0.106 -0.219* -0.115 -0.250**
(0.099) (0.123) (0.098) (0.120)
Services -0.121 -0.167 -0.143 -0.212**
(0.117) (0.133) (0.108) (0.104)
Technology -0.047 -0.006 -0.052 -0.017
(0.091) (0.102) (0.093) (0.100)
Telecomm 0.116 0.174 0.104 0.144
(0.139) (0.124) (0.144) (0.129)
Mid-Atlantic 0.051 0.134* 0.040 0.121**
(0.059) (0.071) (0.053) (0.059)
New York Metro 0.092* 0.194*** 0.097* 0.206***
(0.053) (0.074) (0.052) (0.076)
Northeast 0.075 0.111* 0.080 0.120**
(0.055) (0.061) (0.057) (0.061)
South Central -0.002 -0.037 0.016 -0.067
(0.147) (0.090) (0.179) (0.127)
Southeast 0.110 -0.012 0.106 -0.025
(0.072) (0.067) (0.072) (0.059)
Southwest 0.031 -0.011 0.035 -0.004
(0.079) (0.072) (0.076) (0.064)
Upper Midwest -0.047 -0.061 -0.052 -0.079
(0.056) (0.075) (0.055) (0.073)
West 0.025 0.029 0.015 0.015
(0.052) (0.056) (0.050) (0.059)
0.042*** 0.026*** 0.050*** 0.030***
(0.005) (0.001) (0.008) (0.013)
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Kleinbergen-Paap Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003
Hanson Test (p-value) 0.639 0.476 0.701 0.738
R2 0.684 0.605 0.690 0.638
N 141 141 141 141
Regions b :
1st Stage Resultsc
Operating Revenue
IV IV
In (TIV)
Liquidity
In (Premium/Quality)
Solvency Ratio
Current Ratio
Industries a :
 
Notes: Dependent Variable Cover cij. aAgriculture is the omitted industry dummy.  Industry dummies for Mining, Public Entities, Services, and 
Transportation have been dropped because there are not enough firms from these industries in the final sample.  bCentral Midwest is the omitted 
region dummy. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. cOnly the coefficients of the exogenous instruments are reported. Full sets of 1st stage 
results are available upon request. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 presents the results of the 3SLS approach. For each type of insurance coverage, we specify three 
equations which are then estimated simultaneously. The dependent variables are Cover, Premium and the 
natural log of the amount of deductible, ln(Deductible). Again, we are using Operating Revenue and 
Liquidity as exogenous instruments for Premium/Quantity. For ln(Deductible) we are using the amount of 
deductible for flood insurance as an additional instrument. The estimated effect of company size (TIV) is 
-0.174 for property and -0.072 for terror coverage. Thereby, the estimated coefficients of TIV are very 
similar to those estimated using 2SLS in Table 3 (approx. 0.1).  
The estimated price elasticity is -0.295 for property and -0.247 for terrorism insurance. Compared to the 
2SLS estimates, these values are slightly larger, but still indicate a relatively inelastic demand. In 
addition, they also support our hypothesis that demand for terrorism insurance is more inelastic.  The 
critical t-value of the Chow test is 15.36 and again rejects the null hypothesis of equality of the price 
elasticity parameters. With respect to the firms’ self-insurance capabilities, we find a statistically 
significant effect of the solvency ratio on terror coverage but not on property coverage. However, again, 
the effect is very small. The 3SLS estimates reveal that the deductible choice has a systematic and 
positive effect on the quantity of insurance purchased of property insurance, which is in line with Aunon-
Nerin & Ehling (2008). We do not find a statistically significant result on this relationship in the case of 
terrorism insurance. We also find a negative relation between solvency ratio and terrorism insurance 
coverage.  
Table 4: Demand for Property and Terrorism Insurance - 3SLS-Estimates 
Cover ln (Premium/ Quantity) ln (Deductible) Cover ln (Premium/ Quantity) ln (Deductible)
ln (TIV) -0.174*** 0.254*** 0.422*** -0.072* 0.467*** 0.155
(0.036) (0.055) (0.088) (0.040) (0.080) (0.210)
ln (Premium/Quantity) -0.295*** 0.528** -0.247*** 0.815**
(0.034) (0.209) (0.091) (0.402)
ln (Deductible) 0.165*** 0.064
(0.036) (0.046)
Solvency Ratio -0.000 0.007** -0.014** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006)
Current Ratio -0.012 -0.030 0.035 -0.016 -0.096 0.095
(0.023) (0.067) (0.096) (0.026) (0.098) (0.133)
Operating Revenue 0.046*** 0.024**
(0.009) (0.011)
Liquidity -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Flood 8.83e -08*** 9.66e -08***
Deductible (0.000) (0.000)
Industry FEa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Property Terror
 
Notes: aAgriculture is the omitted industry dummy. Industry dummies for Mining, Public Entities, Services, and Transportation have been 
dropped because there are not enough firms from these industries in the final sample. bCentral Midwest is the omitted region dummy.  Standard 
errors in parenthesis are clustered on insurance company level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 provides the results of the QMLE to take into account the bounded nature of the dependent 
variable (Coverci). Tobit and IV-Tobit estimates are also provided. All numbers in the table are marginal 
effects, to allow comparability with the estimated coefficients in Tables 3 and 4. 
For all three estimators, the effect of company size (measured as TIV) on the demand for property and 
terrorism insurance lies in a range between -0.085 and -0.151 and are thereby very similar to the 
estimated coefficients in from the 2SLS and 3SLS results. 
Table 5: Demand for Property and Terrorism Insurance - QMLE, Tobit & IV-Tobit 
Property Terror Property Terror Property Terror
ln (TIV) -0.151*** -0.149*** -0.102*** -0.085*** -0.099*** -0.094***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024)
ln (Premium/Quantity) -0.358*** -0.160*** -0.190*** -0.112*** -0.219*** -0.138***
(0.034) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.035) (0.049)
Solvency Ratio -0.002* -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Current Ratio 0.002 0.019 -0.001 0.011 -0.005 0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Industry FEa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
QMLE Tobit IV-Tobit
 
Notes: Dependent Variable: Cover cij. N=193 aAgriculture is the omitted industry dummy. Industry dummies for Mining, Public Entities, 
Services, and Transportation have been dropped because there are not enough firms from these industries in the final sample. bCentral Midwest is 
the omitted region dummy.  Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on insurance company level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Comparing the coefficients of Premium/Quantity for the QMLE, we find again that the demand for 
terrorism insurance is significantly less price elastic (-0.160) than the demand for property insurance (-
0.358). A price increase of 10% will decrease the quantity of property insurance purchased by 3.58% and 
the quantity of terrorism insurance by only 1.60%. The Tobit and IV-Tobit yield similar results. Solvency 
ratio is again found to have a significantly negative effect, albeit fairly small.  
Overall, the different econometric models yield a very coherent picture: corporate demand for property 
insurance is rather inelastic (in the range of -0.19 to -0.36, depending on the econometric specification we 
selected) and demand for terrorism risk insurance is even more price inelastic (-0.11 to -0.25). Based on 
the results from a Chow test, the differences in the estimated coefficients are found to be statistically 
significant.  It might also be the case that terrorism insurance sold as an add-on policy covering only one 
type of hazard, combined with the intense visual media coverage of any successful attack, makes 
managers of the firm focus more on the negative consequences of an attack rather than its probability. 
Moreover, firms purchasing both property coverage and terrorism coverage might consider the cost of 
terrorism coverage as being comparatively inexpensive relative to what they pay for property coverage. 
Finally, there might be a stronger willingness from the board of directors to support this purchase in the 
aftermath of the 2001 attacks and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in 2002.    
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These results on corporate insurance choices are important findings because they stand in contrast to 
individual insurance choices in controlled laboratory experiments (Ganderton, Brookshire, McKee, 
Stewart & Thurston 2000) and empirical studies on homeowners’ insurance (e.g., Grace, Klein & 
Kleindorfer 2004, Kunreuther, Meyer & Michel-Kerjan 2013) which reveal that the majority of 
homeowners actually do not purchase catastrophe coverage, and that those who do exhibit a significantly 
higher price elasticity than what we find to be the case for corporations in our sample.  
For instance, Grace et al. (2004) look at homeowners’ insurance and distinguish demand for catastrophe 
risk (hurricane risk) and non-catastrophe risk insurance. They found a price elasticity coefficient equal to 
-1.9 for hurricane risk insurance and -0.4 for non-catastrophe risk. Prior studies of price elasticities of 
demand for residential flood insurance found to be in the range of −0.62 to −0.87 (Landry & Jahan-Parvar 
2011) to -0.99 (Browne & Hoyt 2000), and as high as −1.55 to -4.48 for flood insurance policyholders 
who benefit from subsidized rates by the federal government (Landry & Jahan-Parvar 2011). As we 
discussed in the present study, there are numerous institutional arrangements that exist in the corporate 
world that do not apply to homeowners and that explain this difference. It is also interesting to see how 
our results on price elasticity compare to evidence in the literature for other fields. Elasticity of the 
demand for crop insurance for farmers was found to be in the -0.30 to -0.90 range (Garner & Kramer 
1986; Goodwin 1993; Barnet & Skees 1995; Shaik et al. 2008). Price elasticity for auto insurance was 
found to be -0.56, for automobiles to be -1.20 and for dining out, -2.27 (Hoyt 1990). Gruber and Letteau 
(2004), which provides a comprehensive review of the literature on demand elasticity for health 
insurance, found the elasticity of firms’ demand for health insurance spending to be -0.70.  
We now turn to a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results with respect to 
alternative indicators of self-insurance capability and company size.  Table 6 looks at the effect of four 
alternative measures of financial strength: Net Income; Net Assets Turnover; Stock Turnover; and 
Liquidity Ratio. We apply the same specifications for property and terrorism coverage as in Table 3, but 
replace Solvency Ratio and Current Ratio, with each of the four alternative measures, separately. The 
coefficient of net income (profit and loss ratio) depicts a negative sign for property and terrorism 
coverage, which is only statistically significant (at the 10% level) for property insurance. Net Assets 
Turnover, Stock Turnover and Liquidity Ratio all yield a negative coefficient. However, only the effect of 
stock turnover on property coverage is statistically significant. These four measures are mainly indicators 
of short-term financial strength. In combination with our main results, where only the solvency ratio has a 
statistically significant self-insurance effect, we interpret these results as an indication that it is mainly the 
ability to meet long-term obligations that matter for self-insurance considerations, rather than short-term 
financial strength. Our results on premium elasticity stay qualitatively and quantitatively the same. 
In a further robustness check, we test whether our results change if we use alternative measures of 
company size. Our dependent variable Cover is the ratio of total limit over TIV. Therefore, the negative 
coefficient of TIV on the right-hand side of the equations could be the result of being in the denominator 
of the dependent variable. To check whether our results on the effect of company size on insurance 
demand hold, we replace TIV by alternative measures of company size in Table 7. Instead of TIV, we 
first use the log of sales, which also yields a negative coefficient which is significant at the 1% level. The 
second indicator of size, total number of employees, does not yield significant results. Finally, we include 
all three measures of size, sales, employees and TIV and we find that the coefficient is qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar to our earlier estimates. 
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5. Conclusion 
There have been important theoretical contributions during the past two decades that help explain 
decisions made by corporations as to how they should protect their assets against different types of left-
tail outcomes. Although the empirical literature that focuses on derivative use to analyze corporate risk-
management is consistent with theoretical predictions, it has a number of caveats. For example, hedging 
practices could be correlated with managerial quality and therefore lead to omitted variable bias. In 
addition, a firm’s exposure to certain risks is very often difficult to quantify. Without an appropriate risk 
measurement, it will be hard to analyze whether firms use derivatives to hedge risks or simply to 
speculate. Aunon-Nerin & Ehling (2008) suggest that analyzing financial risk management via corporate 
insurance use can avoid these problems.  
Using complementary dataset on the demand and supply sides, we are able to analyze some of the drivers 
of corporate demand for property coverage across industry sectors and for firms of different sizes for 
value they insured in the United States. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
U.S. terrorism risk insurance market was modified with the passage of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
of 2002 which excluded terrorism from typical property insurance and made it a distinctive policy firm 
can purchase from their insurance in addition to property coverage—that is, a distinctive market. This 
study benefited from access to the data for both lines of coverage, property and terrorism, further 
extending our understanding of how firms approach their insurance strategy.  
We have explained why terrorism is different than other risks typically covered under property insurance 
(or perceived as such by firms) and as a result why managers would exhibit a demand for terrorism 
insurance that would be more price inelastic than for property insurance---a hypothesis that is confirmed 
by our findings across all our econometric specifications (2SLS, 3SLS, QMLE). Larger firms are found to 
purchase relatively less coverage, whether for property or for terrorism.  This might be due to higher 
geographical diversification, more sophisticated in-house risk management expertise and easier access to 
short-term capital.  
Our analysis has some limitations imposed by the data we were able to access. Because our sample 
contains many privately own firms, we were not able access all the data that are available for publically 
traded firms. However, when we performed similar analyses on the subsample of those firms, the results 
were not significantly altered. Another limitation relates to not knowing precisely how the assets under 
coverage are diversified geographically. To our knowledge, this information is not publically available, 
mainly because of commercial and national security concerns. For that reason and after discussing this 
issue with representatives from the industry, it was agreed that the location where the firms were 
headquartered provided a reasonably good proxy.  
Moving this research agenda forward, it would be useful to access more detailed corporate information on 
liquidity, short-term credit or decision structures within the company (including incentive systems in 
place) to provide a comparative analysis of how these other characteristics affect corporate decisions for 
property and terrorism insurance. It would also be useful to extend the analysis provided here to extreme 
events other than terrorism (e.g., large technological accidents, natural disasters). This might be somewhat 
challenging, though, since those other hazards are typically part of the broader property coverage (at least 
up to some basic coverage limit); the main advantage of terrorism insurance from a research perspective 
20 
 
is that today this coverage is sold to firms as a distinct policy. It would also be important to determine 
what role institutional settings play in corporate risk management in general, and for corporate insurance 
purchase strategy in particular, and how this strategy relates to firms’ derivative use. 
Our findings have important policy implications. TRIA requires insurers to offer terrorism risk insurance 
to their corporate clients, who can accept or refuse the coverage. The TRIA legislation was set as a 
temporary one in the aftermath of 9/11 and is set to expire at the end of 2014 unless renewed by Congress 
and the President. An important policy question as part of the debate that is taking place in Congress is 
how corporations think about terrorism threat and act upon it through their insurance decisions. What are 
some of the characteristics of the firms that purchase this coverage and those that do not? How does the 
demand for this coverage differ from other lines and how sensitive is it to price? This study sheds light on 
these questions and should thus be of interest, beyond the research community, to industry and 
policymakers as well.  
In conclusion, corporate behavior is sensitive to market conditions and this might be particularly true in 
the case of terrorism. No major terrorist attack against commercial interests occurred in the United States 
since 2001. The April 2013 Boston Marathon attacks certainly increased concern about terrorism threat, 
again, but the market will be stressed significantly more should another attack of the size of 9/11 occurred 
in the near term. Given the rather inelastic demand we found here, it is likely that more firms would want 
to purchase that coverage even at significantly higher prices.  
Finally, our results could have important implications for the broader hedging literature. We began this 
study by indicating why we thought that focusing on insurance might provide a better environment for 
understanding the corporate hedging decision. To our knowledge there is no empirical study that was able 
to document elasticity of the extent a risk exposure is hedged as option premiums change. Our findings 
might indicate that if firms’ managers believe that oil price risk has a much greater possibility to cause 
bankruptcy than, say, currency risk, (and/or severally affect their reputation as having poor management 
skills), then this firm’s option hedging strategy of oil price risk would be less driven by fluctuations in 
option premiums than it would be for currency risk.   
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